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ABSTRACT
Are purely technological solutions the best answer we can
get to the shortcomings our organizations are often expe-
riencing today? The results we gathered in this work lead
us to giving a negative answer to such question. Science
and technology are powerful boosters, though when they
are applied to the “local, static organization of an obsolete
yesterday” they fail to translate in the solutions we need to
our problems. Our stance here is that those boosters should
be applied to novel, distributed, and dynamic models able
to allow us to escape from the local minima our societies
are currently locked in. One such model is simulated in this
paper to demonstrate how it may be possible to tap into
the vast basins of social energy of our human societies to
realize ubiquitous computing sociotechnical services for the
identification and timely response to falls.
CCS Concepts
•Applied computing → Health care information sys-
tems; •Computing methodologies→ Simulation eval-
uation; •Human-centered computing → Collabora-
tive and social computing systems and tools;
Keywords
Falls identification; telecare; sociotechnical systems; agent-
based simulation; role-flow
1. INTRODUCTION
I suppose it is tempting,
if the only tool you have is a hammer,
to treat everything as if it were a nail.
Abraham Maslow,
The Psychology of Science
A well-known syndrome introduced by Abraham Maslow
is the so-called “law of the instrument”, stating that solu-
tions to problems are often influenced by the tools available
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off-the-shelf [16]. This obviously introduces limitations and
inefficiencies. A typical case in point is given by informa-
tion and communication technology (ICT) solutions to the
problem of fall identification. Falls are the “most significant
cause of injury for elderly persons” [14]—more specifically
“the most serious life-threatening events that can occur” in
the 65+ age group [11]. Although not a frequent event,
it is one whose consequences are often of the most con-
cern [11, 2], especially in the case proper treatment is not
timely dispatched to the fallen person. A common “tool”
to deal with this problem is fall detection devices. Such
devices—for instance accelerometers, gyroscopes, or other
sensors—constantly monitor a person and trigger an alarm
when some safety threshold is reached. A major limitation
and inefficiency of this approach is due to the current diffi-
culties of our algorithms and their implementations to pro-
vide reliable assessments of real-life situations. Despite the
continuing technological progress, it is still very difficult for
an ICT monitoring device to determine whether a person
has actually fallen or if, e.g., he or she has knelt down very
quickly. The use of redundancy—by coupling, for instance,
two accelerometers of different technology and design) im-
proves the sensitivity (i.e., reduces the false negative rate),
though this is often reached at the price of increasing the
false alarm ratio (i.e., reducing the specificity). The already
high social costs are thus exacerbated by unnecessary inter-
ventions due to false alarms.
How to deal with this problem? One way is to try and
improve the current tools. Purely ICT solutions to fall de-
tection assessment are the subject of numerous research ac-
tions, which results in improvements in both sensitivity and
specificity. Despite those efforts, “no silver bullet [is] in sight
[yet]” [2]. Another possibility is to widen our horizons and
look for different and better approaches. In this paper we
discuss one such approach. We propose to go beyond the
purely technological solution and to integrate humans in the
system. The resulting socio-technological system is intro-
duced and analyzed here by means of a multi-agent simula-
tion model. We show that by integrating information from
the cyber- and the physical domain and by appointing veri-
fication tasks to a “cloud” of human agents it is possible to
overcome, to some extent, the current limitations and inef-
ficiencies of purely ICT-based solutions.
In what follows we first briefly recall in Sect. 2 a number
of definitions. Section 3 then briefly summarizes the key
elements of our fractal social organizations—a distributed,
bio-inspired organization that we have used to structure the
simulation models employed in this paper. Section 4 follows
ar
X
iv
:1
50
8.
06
65
5v
1 
 [c
s.C
Y]
  2
6 A
ug
 20
15
and introduces our actor classes. Two classes of simulation
models corresponding to the use of either one or two fall
detectors coupled with a variable number of human agents
are given in Sect. 5. Results are discussed in Sect. 6, while
Sect. 7 recalls the major lessons learned and concludes.
2. FIGURES OF INTEREST
We now introduce the figures we focus our attention on in
the course of our simulations.
Definition 1 (False positive rate). False Positive
(FP) rate (commonly known also as False Alarm rate) is
the probability of concluding that the observed facts do imply
the identification of a situation, when in fact that is not the
case. The event did not take place, but the system “fired”.
Every occurrence of said wrong conclusion is called a FP.
In the face of a FP, assistance is delivered but results in
a waste of resources. Social costs go up without providing
any social returns.
Definition 2 (Specificity). Specificity is the proba-
bility of correctly identifying that a given event has not taken
place. It is equal to 1− FP rate.
Definition 3 (False negative rate). False negative
(FN) rate is the probability of not being able to identify the
occurrence of an event that took place. The event was ex-
perienced, though the system did not “fire”. Every time the
system fails to identify a true fall we shall say that a FN oc-
curred. In other words, a FN is a missed alarm: the system
did not react in the face of a true fall.
Definition 4 (Sensitivity). Sensitivity is the proba-
bility of correctly identifying that a given event has taken
place. Sensitivity is equal to 1− FN rate.
As efficaciously observed by Dr. Tom Doris, KeepUs project
founder and technical lead [2],
“In any safety system, false negatives are possibly
the worst kind of failure.”
This is particularly true in the case of falls. Quoting again
Dr. Doris,
“the single most important factor influencing the
long-term outcome [after a fall] is the length of
time between the fall and getting medical atten-
tion at a hospital. A few hours more or less
makes the difference between life and death.”
Evidence of a strict correlation between the time of arrival
of medical caregivers and the mortality rate may be found
also in [11, 1].
A problem we tackle in this paper is the well-known cor-
relation between FP and FN. Whatever the method in use
today, if one wants to reduce FN rate, usually FP rate goes
up [2]. In what follows we are going to introduce a method
to deal with this problem based on the use of “social energy,”
which we defined in [5] as “the self-serve, self-organization,
and self-adaptability potentials of our societies.”
As a first component of our solution we now briefly intro-
duce the main elements of the organizational structure that
we call “fractal social organizations.”
3. FRACTAL SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS
Fractal Social Organizations (FSO) is an organizational
structure that realizes a nested compositional hierarchy [21]
(NCH): the system is a network of nodes, each of which is
a network of other nodes. FSO nodes are called circles. Be-
ing a NCH means that the FSO is structured as concentric
circles. Examples of said circles may be for instance an em-
ployee of a business enterprise; an office of that enterprise;
the whole business enterprise; or a business ecosystem in-
cluding several business bodies. In each FSO circle there is
a node that coordinates that circle. Said coordinator node
receives notification data from all the nodes of its circle. No-
tifications received by the coordinator describe the evolving
of situational and context information. This means that any
node state change and also any detected external change are
reported1.
The circle coordinator is an autonomic computing agent
implementing a MAPE loop. Received data is fed into the
loop’s “M” component—namely, its perception organ. Once
received, data is analyzed and integrated (by the “A” com-
ponent) and semantically matched with the information al-
ready known to the coordinator. Deductions are fed into a
the planner component (“P”), which selects a response pro-
tocol through a simple algorithm. The selected protocol is
then executed by component “E”.
Protocols are associated at design time to state transitions
and situation identifications. If, for instance, situation i =
“fall suspected in flat 145” is associated to protocol pi, then
as soon as i is identified protocol pi is readied for running.
A readied protocol is a protocol that has been authorized
for launching though is not running yet. Protocols in fact
require the availability of one or more agents. Protocol pi
may need, e.g., the cooperation of a general practitioner,
a nurse, an ambulance, an ambulance driver, and specific
medical devices.
In order to launch a protocol, the coordinator needs to
enroll agents: assign agents to the needed roles. This is sim-
ilar to data-flow, only it requires active roles instead of data.
Because of this similarity, we call this a role-flow approach.
An alternative way to describe the FSO protocols is to con-
sider them as guarded actions [10] whose guards express the
successful enrollment of agents.
An important aspect of FSO is the fact that the coordina-
tor does not care whether a candidate actor is a professional
carer, a volunteer, a patient, or a machine. The agent just
needs to qualify for the sought role. This means that agents
need to be known beforehand in order to play significant
roles in an FSO. Knowing an agent means having a seman-
tic description of what the agent may do. More information
about this ma be found in [9, 20]. No semantic processing
is used in our simulation models due to their simple formu-
lation.
If the coordinator can find agents for all the roles it re-
quires, the protocol starts. If not, there is what we call a role
exception. This means that the circle coordinator publishes
a new event in the “parent circle”– the circle that includes
the current circle as a node. If not all the requested agents
can be enrolled in the parent circle, this results in a new
role exception. Through this mechanism the coordinators
1In our prototypical implementation of the FSO this was
implemented via a standardized, asynchronous publish-and-
subscribe mechanism [18].
“spread the news” about the missing roles throughout the
levels of the network. As soon as enrollment is completed,
the enrolled agents become a new transient FSO whose aim
and lifespan is defined by the execution of their associated
protocol. We call said transient FSO a “social overlay net-
work.”
This realizes inter-organizational collaboration and shifts
the responsibility for service response composition from the
user to the “system”—more information about this is pro-
vided in [8].
FSO circles are structured as so-called service-oriented
communities (SoC’s). They are described in detail in [5,
6]. A special case of SoC is given by a person and a periph-
ery of devices that the person has access to. We call such
SoC an individual SoC (iSoC).
Figure 1 represents the set of all possible social overlay
networks in an FSO including six roles (roles 0–5) and 12
agents distributed as follows: role 0, role 1, and role 5 are
played by 3 agents each while role 2, role 3, and role 4 are
played by 1 agent each.
Figure 1: Tridimensional representation of all
the social overlay networks derivable from FSO
“000111234555”. Rendering is done via POV-
Ray [13].
4. SIMULATION MODEL
For our simulations we use NetLogo [22], a tool that allows
agent-based rapid prototyping. Netlogo provides a simula-
tion area that functions as a virtual world in which events
are triggered on the initialized agents in discrete time steps
called “ticks”. The simulation area includes several classes
of agents, which are described in what follows.
Definition 5 (Elderly Agent). Elderly agents (EA’s)
are agents representing elderly or impaired persons. EA’s are
assumed not to leave their house, in which their condition is
monitored by Device Agents (see Definition 8).
Definition 6 (Professional Carer). Professional
carers (PC’s) represent agents able to supply certified health-
care services to other agents. Such agents are institutional,
meaning that their action is regulated by rules, laws, and
a professional code of service. This translates into relative
high availability and guarantees of timely intervention.
Definition 7 (Informal Carer; Verification). In-
formal carers (IC’s) are mobile agents that are able to pro-
vide non-professional services. In what follows it is assumed
that IC’s can move to the location of an EA and report
whether that EA has truly experienced a fall or not. This
operation is called in what follows verification. Symbol V (x)
shall be used to represent a verification carried out by agent
x.
Definition 8 (Device Agent). Device agents (DA’s)
are simple purposefully-behaviored [19] devices (as, e.g., ac-
celerometers, gyroscopes, motion sensors, cameras, combus-
tion detectors, etc.) that are able to provide domotica or
telemonitoring services. In particular an accelerometer and
a gyroscope DA both trigger an alarm when they ascertain,
with a certain probability, that an EA has fallen. Another
example of DA is a motion sensor estimating the motion
vector of an EA moving in his or her house.
As already mentioned, DA are characterized by a non-zero
probability of FP’s and FN’s. Thus for instance in some
cases an accelerometer may detect a fall when this is not
true, while in some other cases that accelerometer may not
detect a true case of fall.
Definition 9 (Mobility Agent). Mobile agents (MA’s)
are agents able to provide extended mobility services to other
agents. In what follows a single type of MA is employed,
which represents ambulances.
Definition 10 (Community Agent; Canon). Com-
munity agents (CA’s) are agents coordinating a “circle” of
other agents. In what follows it is assumed that CA’s im-
plement the set of rules and actions of SoC’s, namely the
building blocks of the organizational structure introduced in
Sect. 3. The CA rules and coordination actions are called
the canon of the FSO [15]. CA’s may be implemented as
middleware components as described in, e.g., [4].
4.1 Simulation FSO
The FSO adopted in our simulations is structured into
three concentric levels:
1. The innermost level is constituted by iSoC’s (see Sect. 3)
coupling an EA with one or more DA’s that continu-
ously “watch” the EA in order to assess whether a fall
event has taken place. Each of the iSoC also includes
a CA, called in what follows “L1-CA” (level-1 CA).
iSoC’s correspond to primary users of ambient assisted
living (AAL) services [17]. They could be visualized,
e.g., as a smart house inhabited by an elderly person.
Figure 2: NetLogo screenshot of the simulation area
with initialized agents.
2. The middle level is an SoC that includes the iSoC’s
(represented by their L1-CA’s), a number of IC agents,
and a coordinating CA. The latter shall be called in
what follows “L2-CA” (level-2 CA). This SoC corre-
sponds to primary and secondary users (sensu [17]).
The elderly people, their relatives, and a “cloud” of in-
formal carers may be used to visualize the second level
of our FSO.
3. The outermost FSO level is constituted by the mid-
dle level SoC (represented by its L2-CA), a number
of PC and MA agents, and a coordinating CA (“L3-
CA”). This SoC represents all the AAL stakeholders
in a certain region—including the infrastructures those
stakeholder have access to.
As already discussed in Sect. 3, the agents associated with
a coordinating CA send it notifications. Whenever there is a
need for communication between the CA’s of distinct levels,
“exception” messages are triggered. It is assumed that these
messages are transmitted reliably and instantaneously. The
overall FSO structure is depicted in Fig. 3.
The operation of the FSO is as follows: the EA’s in the
innermost iSoC may or may not experience falls. At the
same time, the DA’s associated to the EA’s may or may not
issue their “fall detected” event. When they do, the event
reaches L1-CA.
Four are the major protocols that may be executed:
1. Protocol p1 corresponds to a request for care requiring
a PC and a MA. As both roles are missing, this triggers
an exception, namely an event for L2-CA. No agents
may be enrolled in the middle level of the FSO as that
SoC lacks PC and MA agents. As a consequence, a
new exception ensues. The event thus reaches L3-CA
where agents are enrolled and the readied protocol p1 is
finally launched. Because of this, a general practitioner
leaves his or her hospital with an ambulance directed
to the house the “fail detected” event originated from.
2. Protocol p2 corresponds to a request for verification.
As verification requires an IC agent it may be consid-
ered as a secondary care intervention. In this case the
event is resolved in the middle level of the FSO. En-
rollment follows and p2 is launched. The verification
step is concluded with either a confirmation or a can-
cellation of the “fall event”. In the latter case, a “FP
event” is issued by the IC agent.
3. As we have just described, an “FP event” takes place
in the middle level of the FSO and readies a third
protocol, p3. Said protocol is only used to forward
the FP event to the outermost level. To do so, the
protocol simply “enrolls” the L3-CA agent. Obviously
L2-CA has no actor able to play role L3-CA, thus an
exception is raised and delivers the FP event to its
intended consignee.
4. The arrival of the FP event at L3-CA triggers a fourth
protocol, p4, which requires no roles and thus immedi-
ately cancels p1.
Canceling a protocol means that, if the protocol is still
being executed, its execution is aborted. Actors involved
in a canceled protocol are again available for enrollment in
readied protocols. In the case of a PC and MA, canceling a
p1 protocol makes both agents reach their“base of operation”
(i.e., a hospital.)
Note that if the execution of p1 is very fast, the PC and
MA may reach the EA sooner than the IC. In a such a case
it is p2 that is canceled. If so, the enrolled IC is “freed” and
resumes its “random walk” through the virtual world.
A visualization of the simulation area containing the ini-
tialized agents can be seen in Fig. 2. The green “person”
shape represents the EA agents, while the connected de-
vices represent the DA’s. The white building represents the
hospital, and connected to it we have the MA’s and PC’s.
Figure 3: A representation of the FSO employed in
our simulation models.
5. SIMULATION SCENARIOS
Here we first introduce in Sect. 5.1 a number of figures
used to summarize the results of our simulations. Simulation
scenarios are then described in Sect. 5.2.
5.1 Evaluation metrics
Definition 11 (Social Cost). We shall call social cost
(SC) of agent A the number of cycles that A makes use of
to intervene for either a true alarm or a FP.
From its definition it is apparent that, in case of a FP, the
social costs associated with the agents responding to the
alarm are wasted.
Definition 12 (Cumulative Social Cost (
∑
SC )).
Metric
∑
SC is defined as the overall number of cycles used
by all of a community’s agents to deal with the true alarms
and FP’s experienced during a simulation run.
Definition 13 (Number of Treated Cases). The
number of treated cases ( ]) is the total amount of alarms—
either true cases or FP—that took place in the course of a
simulation run.
Definition 14 (Normalized
∑
SC ). Normalized cu-
mulative social cost (
∑̂
SC ) is given by the ratio
∑
SC
]
.
Definition 15 (Waiting Time). Waiting time (WT)
is the number of cycles elapsed from the event of a triggered
alarm to either of the following events: the arrival of care;
the canceling of the care request; confirmation of FP; the
end of the simulation run.
Definition 16 (Cumulative Waiting Time (
∑
WT)).∑
WT is the sum of all the individual WT’s that took place
during a simulation run.
Definition 17 (Normalized
∑
WT). Metric
∑̂
WT
is given by the ratio is given by the ratio
∑
WT
]
.
5.2 Scenarios
In our experiments we distinguish two classes of scenarios:
S1(X) In this scenario every EA is “guarded” by a single
sensor to monitor for the occurrence of the fall event.
X IC’s are defined. When X = 0, there is no level-2
FSO. Scenario S1 is described through the pseudo-code
in Table 1.
S2(X) In this scenario two DA’s are used per each EA (as
suggested, e.g., in [14]). In what follows we shall refer
to the two DA’s as an accelerometer (A) and a gyro-
scope (G). X is as in S1(X). Scenario S2 is described
through the pseudo-code in Table 2.
As seen in Table 1, the AlarmEvent function keeps track
of and returns either the number of ticks necessary to reach
the corresponding EA or the number of ticks until a protocol
p4 is executed and the AlarmEvent is interrupted.
In scenario S1 and S2 we consider the following configu-
ration of agents:
• 30 EA’s residing in their houses. House locations are
assigned in cells chosen pseudo-randomly in the virtual
world. The same distribution of cells is used in each
run of the simulations.
• 1 hospital (Level 3 CA), located in a cell chosen as
described above.
Scenario S1 // A single DA, zero or more IC agents.
Begin
//
∑
FP : total amount of FP events
//
∑
FN : total amount of FN events
//
∑
SC (S1): amount of ticks spent. . .
// . . . to manage a “fall event” (see Sect. 4)
// pF: probability to experience a fall
// pFN: probability of a FN event
// pFP: probability of a FP event∑
FP ← 0,∑FN ← 0,∑SC (S1)← 0, ] ← 0;
For all ticks ∈ T Do
// Toss(pF) returns 1 with probability pF,. . .
// . . . and 0 with probability 1 - pF
TrueFall ← Toss(pF);
If (TrueFall ≡ 1) Then
// res is 1 with probability pFN
res ← Toss(pFN);
If (res ≡ 1) Then
// (There is a fall) ∧ (fall goes undetected)
FN ← 1;
Else
// (There is a fall) ∧ (fall is correctly detected)
// AlarmEvent returns the number of ticks . . .
// . . . necessary to reach the fallen EA
cost ← AlarmEvent()
// Number of treated cases is updated
] ← ] + 1;
Endif
Else // TrueFall is not set
// res is 1 with probability pFP
res ← Toss(pFP);
If (res ≡ 1) Then
// (There is no fall fall) ∧ (phantom fall is detected)
FP ← 1;
// AlarmEvent returns the number of ticks. . .
// . . . until the EA is reached. . .
// . . . or until the service is interrupted. . .
// . . . by a call to protocol p4.
cost ← AlarmEvent()
// Number of treated cases is updated
] ← ] + 1;
Else
// (There is no fall) ∧ (no phantom fall is detected)
// Thus, do nothing!
Endif
Endif∑
FN← ∑FN + FN ;∑
FP← ∑FP + FP ;∑
SC (S1) ←
∑
SC (S1) + cost ;
Enddo
End
Table 1: Pseudo-code of Scenario S1.
• 6 PC’s and 5 MA’s (ambulances) are located with the
hospital.
We assume a certain probability of an actual “fall event”.
Let us call pF said probability. In what follows, pF =
1
600
.
Once an actual fall takes place, we shall call pFN the prob-
ability that that fall shall not be detected. Likewise, every
time a fall does not take place, we shall call pFP the proba-
bility that a fall is (erroneously) detected.
It is important to highlight how pFN and pFP are normally
specific of a given sensor; to facilitate the description of our
experiments, in what follows we shall assume that both A
and G have the same pFN and pFP, respectively equal to
1
5
and
1
500
. Corresponding events are assumed to be independent
of each other (in other words, there is no correlation between
those events).
We now describe the results obtained in scenarios S1, S2,
and S3.
6. RESULTS
Experiments are run for X = 0 to 40 by increasing X
by five IC’s per experiment. Each experiment lasts 10000
“ticks”. Results for the S1 scenarios are shown in Table 3
while for the S2 scenarios they are shown in Table 4.
Let us first consider FP, FN, Sensitivity, and Specificity.
If we compare scenario S1 to S2 without IC’s we can observe
that in S2 the number of FP’s increases by more than 100
FP units. This is due to the addition of a second DA: as can
be seen from Table 2, with two DA’s the alarm is triggered
as a result of an OR operation of the alarms of each DA [7].
Moreover, by increasing X we can observe that FP events
increase too. This is because the higher the number of IC’s,
the sooner validation will occur.
Results can be seen in Figures 4–8.
Figure 4: Number of alarm requests handled by the
system for S1 and S2 with a number of IC’s ranging
from 0 to 40.
The FN values in S1 are almost thrice those in S2 for
X = 0. This is because in S2 an AND operation is performed
between the FN outcome of DA1 and DA2 (see again Ta-
ble 2). As a result the probability of having a FN decreases
in S2, and only when we have a FN from both alarms the
FN is reported. With X > 0 we see that the addition of
IC’s doesn’t produce improvements. This is because in our
simulation models IC’s cannot identify FN’s. The graph in
Figure 5 depicts the FP ratios of S1, and S2 with various
number of IC’s. The FN ratios are visualized in Figure 6.
A larger number of alarms and a smaller number of FN’s
translates into a more sensitive system. This is because by
triggering more alarms, more cases where the alarm is truly
positive are covered. On the other hand, there is no differ-
ence observed with regard to the specificity parameter for
Scenario S2 // Two DA’s, zero or more IC agents.
Begin
//
∑
FP : total amount of FP events
//
∑
FN : total amount of FN events
//
∑
SC (S2): amount of ticks spent. . .
// . . . to manage a “fall event” (see Sect. 4)
// pF: probability to experience a fall
// pFN: probability of a FN event for both A and G
// pFP: probability of a FP event for either A or G∑
FP ← 0, ∑FN ← 0, ∑SC (S2)← 0, ] ← 0;
For all ticks ∈ T Do
// Toss(pF) returns 1 with probability pF,. . .
// . . . and 0 with probability 1 - pF
TrueFall ← Toss(pF);
If (TrueFall ≡ 1) Then
A1: res ← Toss(pFN);
If (res ≡ 1) Then
// (There is a fall) ∧ (fall is undetected by A)
FNA ← 1;
Else
// (There is a fall) ∧ (fall is correctly detected by A)
// AlarmEvent returns the number of ticks. . .
// . . . necessary to reach the fallen EA
cost ← AlarmEvent();
// Number of treated cases is updated
] ← ] + 1;
Endif
G1: res ← Toss(pFN);
If (res ≡ 1) Then
// (There is a fall) ∧ (fall is undetected by G)
FNG ← 1;
Else // (There is a fall) ∧ (fall is correctly detected by G)
// If the fall was not already detected by A. . .
If (FNA 6≡ 1) Then
cost ← AlarmEvent(); ] ← ] + 1;
Endif
Endif
FN ← FNA ∧ FNG;
ResetAllFlags();
Else // TrueFall is not set
A2: res ← Toss(pFP);
If (res ≡ 1) Then
// (There is no fall) ∧ (phantom fall is detected by A)
FPA ← 1;
Endif
G2: res ← Toss(pFP);
If (res ≡ 1) Then
// (There is no fall) ∧ (phantom fall is detected by G)
FPG ← 1;
Endif
FP ← FPA ∨ FPG;
If (FP ≡ 1) Then
// AlarmEvent returns the number of ticks. . .
// . . . until the EA is reached or until the. . .
// . . . service is interrupted by a call to p4.
cost ← AlarmEvent(); ] ← ] + 1;
Endif
Endif∑
FN ←∑FN + FN ; ∑FP ←∑FP + FP ;∑
SC (S2)←
∑
SC (S2) + cost ;
ResetAllFlags();
Enddo
End
Table 2: Pseudo-code of Scenario S2.
Figure 5: FP ratio for S1 and S2 with a number of
IC’s ranging from 0 to 40.
each scenario. From the results in Table 3 and Table 4 we
see that in S1, with or without volunteers, the average sen-
sitivity is 79.55%, while for S2 it increases to an average of
89.92%. The Specificity values stay the same for all scenar-
ios with an average close to 99%.
We now focus our attention to social costs. If we compare
S1(0) with the case where IC’s are added, we observe a sig-
nificant decrease in the cost of MA’s. This is because the
IC’s help verifying the actual condition of the EA agents,
thus reducing the cost of MA’s. The same applies for the
S2 scenarios. Figure 7 depicts the relation between
∑̂
SC
and X for both scenarios. In the case of S1, the minimum is
reached for 20 IC’s after which average social cost appears
to stabilize. Another metric that shows the impact of IC’s
in the MA cost is the number of alarm verification’s. In all
scenarios where IC’s are present the number of verifications
performed by means of MA’s is reduced drastically.
A significant metric is the average time until a triggered
alarm for an EA gets verified, namely
∑̂
WT . The aver-
age waiting time reflects the reaction time of the system for
a given event. The best results are obtained with 10 IC’s.
Additional effort beyond this value produces little improve-
ment. With 10 IC’s no significant differences are observed
between S1 and S2. A graph showing the average waiting
time in function of the number of IC’s is given in Fig. 8.
We can conclude that the involvement of IC agents in
the fall identification system using the FSO model helps re-
ducing the social costs, while at the same time the average
response time to fall events is reduced. Moreover, it tran-
spires that the involvement of IC agents is beneficial up to
some threshold—possibly in function of the dimensions of
the virtual word and other simulation parameters.
More and more complex experiments shall follow. In par-
ticular we plan to explore the relation between the exhibited
amount of social cooperation and an organization’s ability
to deliver and sustain a given state of “welfare”.
7. CONCLUSIONS
We are greatly frustrated
by all our local, static organization
of an obsolete yesterday.
Richard Buckminster Fuller,
Synergetics I
Traditional organizations are today confronted with un-
precedented scenarios. As an example, the aging of the
population, and even more the chronic diseases associated
with aging place substantial demands on health and social
care services. On the other hand, the “old recipes”, which
appeared to work in a less turbulent context, now reveal all
their limitations. Traditional healthcare services, even when
backed by the most advanced ICT, find it difficult to meet
the ensuing ever increasing demand while guaranteeing both
safety and cost-effectiveness. As observed by Buckminster
Fuller, this is mainly due the inflexible and static organiza-
tion of those services. As observed, e.g., in [12], the new
context “requires new ways of working.”
In this article we demonstrate one such way. By integrat-
ing the cost-effective context detection abilities of telecare
devices with the superior cognitive functions of human be-
ings we showed how it is possible to improve, to some extent
and under certain conditions, the performance and quality
of a health-critical service. Our preliminary results indicate
that distributed and dynamic organizations able to tap into
the wells of “social energy” [3, 5, 9] of our societies may
constitute the basis for novel, smarter solutions to the new
problems of our ever more complex world.
Our future experiments will aim at understanding how
the size of the virtual world and the distribution of agents
influence the results. For this we are considering to design
an ad hoc simulator privileging performance to graphical
rendering.
Figure 6: FN ratio for S1 and S2 with a number of
IC’s ranging from 0 to 40.
S1(0) S1(5) S1(10) S1(15) S1(20) S1(25) S1(30) S1(35) S1(40)
FP 299 320 330 335 357 342 311 344 340
FN 56 63 51 46 74 68 52 48 58
TP 195 212 227 228 221 224 232 238 230
TN 147313 171175 165171 166988 170681 167515 162385 163097 166825
Avg. FP/tick 0.0299 0.032 0.033 0.0335 0.0357 0.0342 0.0311 0.0344 0.034
Avg. FN/tick 0.0056 0.0063 0.0051 0.0046 0.0074 0.0068 0.0052 0.0048 0.0058
FP rate 0.6052 0.6015 0.5924 0.595 0.6176 0.6042 0.5727 0.591 0.5964
FN rate 0.00038 0.00037 0.00031 0.00027 0.00043 0.0004 0.00032 0.00029 0.00035
Sensivity 77.68 77.09 81.65 83.21 74.91 76.71 81.69 83.21 79.86
Specificity 99.79 99.81 99.8 99.79 99.79 99.79 99.8 99.78 99.79∑
SC (MA) 33720 25928 25230 25062 23951 24333 23541 24619 24102∑
SC (IC) 0 0 11351 9252 7874 7414 6023 5963 5400∑
WT 58617 16981 11943 9815 8451 7980 6565 6545 5969
] 494 532 557 563 578 566 543 582 570
V (IC) 0 472 540 555 576 566 540 582 568
V (MA 296 33 8 6 0 0 1 0 0
I(MA) 193 211 225 227 220 222 231 235 230∑̂
SC (MA) 68.259 48.737 45.296 44.515 41.438 42.991 43.353 42.301 42.284∑̂
WT 118.658 31.919 21.442 17.433 14.621 14.099 12.09 11.246 10.472
Table 3: Results of S1 scenarios. V stands for “verifications”, I for “interventions”.
S2(0) S2(5) S2(10) S2(15) S2(20) S2(25) S2(30) S2(35) S2(40)
FP 418 603 631 629 663 654 661 651 667
FN 20 24 29 29 23 28 31 30 30
TP 178 235 245 257 255 239 256 255 256
TN 103699 145952 156918 155168 157907 164355 160108 161965 162078
Avg. FP/tick 0.0418 0.0604 0.0631 0.0629 0.0663 0.0654 0.0661 0.0651 0.0667
Avg. FN/tick 0.002 0.0024 0.0029 0.0029 0.0023 0.0028 0.0031 0.003 0.003
FP rate 0.7013 0.7195 0.7203 0.7099 0.7222 0.7323 0.7208 0.7185 0.7226
FN rate 0.00019 0.00016 0.00018 0.00019 0.00015 0.00017 0.00019 0.00018 0.00018
Sensivity 89.89 90.73 89.41 89.86 91.72 89.51 89.19 89.47 89.51
Specificity 99.59 99.58 99.59 99.59 99.58 99.6 99.58 99.59 99.59∑
SC (MA) 38819 30249 27141 26829 26054 25832 26026 25296 25116∑
SC (IC) 0 33426 18114 14344 13048 11269 10199 8723 8785∑
WT 121316 39364 18986 15229 13965 12160 11113 9628 9707
] 596 838 876 886 918 893 917 906 923
V (IC) 0 745 824 877 913 887 913 904 922
V (MA) 420 67 37 5 2 3 1 1 0
I(MA) 161 219 228 235 237 226 239 232 232∑̂
SC (MA) 65.133 36.097 30.983 30.281 28.381 28.927 28.382 27.921 27.211∑̂
WT 203.55 46.974 21.673 17.188 15.212 13.617 12.119 10.627 10.517
Table 4: Results of S2 scenarios. V stands for “verifications”, I for “interventions”.
Figure 7:
∑̂
SC (Average social costs) of S1 and S2
with a number of IC’s ranging from 0 to 40.
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